Essay on Epicurean Conceptions of Death
In the philosophy of Epicurus and his followers, human beings are advised to seek a life of pleasure. Epicureanism is, however, a strange kind of hedonism; rather than touting pleasure for its own sake, the Epicureans advocate a life free from all distress. To achieve such a state of happiness, they proposed among other things a pithy four-fold remedy known as the tetra pharmakon: “Don’t fear god, don’t worry about death; what’s good is easy to get, and what’s terrible is easy to endure” (Inwood and Gerson, vii). Predictably, fear of death was viewed by Epicurus as one of the primary obstacles to living a life free from distress, if not the biggest obstacle. Hence, his arguments that “death is nothing to us” are quite critical to the advancement of his philosophy. In this paper, I will argue in favor of Epicurus’ conclusion that death is nothing to us. I will do so on the grounds that when death is present, we do not exist and thus cannot experience pleasure or distress, and that because of this death likewise causes us neither distress nor pleasure when it is absent.
In his Letter to Menoeceus, as captured by Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus employs two arguments to show that death is nothing to us. The first is simpler and centers around the idea that all good and bad come from sensory experience, and that death is the privation of sense experience. Since death is the privation of sense experience, no good or bad can come from death; hence, it is nothing to us. I consider the second argument offered by Epicurus to be slightly stronger than the first. Though the first appears sound, the second is more comprehensive in that it addresses the anticipation of death rather than just death itself.
In his second argument to show that death is nothing to us, Epicurus must show that death causes no distress whether it is present or absent. He first claims that death causes no distress when present because we, as human beings, do not exist when death is present (4.125.7). This claim reflects the Epicureans’ materialist conception of nature, owing to Democritus’ atomism, since it holds that once one dies, their body and soul decompose and no longer have sense experience. If we do not have sense experience of any kind when dead, then we do not exist in death and cannot be said to experience any kind of distress. Epicurus thus shows that death causes no distress when present.
Epicurus then moves to show that death causes no distress when absent. His first step is to implicitly define false distress, or “unnecessary pain”, as that which is felt erroneously as the result of a wrongful expectation of distress. He does so by stating, “For that which while present causes no distress causes unnecessary pain when merely anticipated” (4.125.4–5). Here, Epicurus argues that if something causes no distress when it is present, it causes a kind of unnecessary or false distress when awaited with dread. In other words, if something will cause no distress when it arrives, it is wrong to worry about it in advance because such anticipation rests on the false belief that its arrival will bring distress. This allows Epicurus to show that death also does not cause distress when it is absent, or when it is merely anticipated, but that any distress experienced in anticipation of death is false.
Epicurus again reiterates why it is foolish for humans to regard death as anything other than nothing. Here he deals both with questions of human existence and fear. It is foolish, for example, for someone to fear death not for the distress it will cause when present, but for the distress it causes when absent — in anticipation (4.125.2–4). According to Epicurus, this fear (the principal form of distress on matters of death) is unnecessary and pointless. Second, as he says, humans either exist or they do not exist; in the former case, death is absent, and in the latter case, death is present (4.125.6–7). Any distress about death when present is foolish and pointless because we will not exist to experience it. Likewise, any fear or distress concerning death when absent is foolish and pointless because we are not experiencing death, and something which causes no distress when present causes only false distress when absent (4.125.5). Death is therefore irrelevant both to the living and to the dead, who do not exist.
Epicurus uses these arguments as a foundation on which to rest a point quite crucial to his philosophy: that “there is nothing fearful in life for one who has grasped that there is nothing fearful in the absence of life” (4.125.1–2). By showing that death, supposedly the most frightening thing, is in fact nothing, Epicurus argues that death should not cause distress. This contributes to his broader argument that humans can achieve a life free from all distress. Here follows a formal reconstruction of Epicurus’ second argument for the conclusion that death is nothing to us, as explained above:
P1) If we do not exist when death is present, then it causes no distress when present.
P2) If death causes no distress when present, then distress in death’s absence is false distress.
P3) If death causes no distress when present and distress in death’s absence is false, then death is nothing to us.
P4) We do not exist when death is present.
C) Death is nothing to us.
This argument is valid and takes the hypothetical syllogism form. I will argue that the argument is sound, since I believe all the premises to be true.
Though I believe this argument to be sound, premises two and three seem the most objectionable and merit further consideration. Premise two in particular is one which many people might find objectionable, since it holds that the anticipation of death should cause us no distress. This seems naturally to be a difficult idea to accept. One might suggest that even if a person will not feel any distress in death, this does not mean that the knowledge that death will come will not cause any distress in the present. This is the very objection which Epicurus dismisses as foolish in his letter (4.125.2–4). This notwithstanding, one could make an argument based in Epicurean conceptions of pleasure. When one becomes aware of their impending death, however quickly it is to come, one realizes sharply that the time allotted to them for pleasurable experience is finite. If, as the Epicureans say, pleasure is the goal of life, then would not a limit on the time allotted to seek it count as distress? (4.128.11–12)
Moreover, one might object to the notion that death causes no distress when absent because of the potential impact of a person’s death on those around them. If a person knows that they will die sooner rather than later, and that their absence will cause their loved ones to live in poverty and misery, they are likely to become distressed. This distress would in theory stem from a person’s love for those around them, since the knowledge that those people might have to face distress on account of one’s death would likely cause distress for that person.
This set of objections actually holds little weight according to Epicurus, since both of them misunderstand the Epicurean idea of pleasure. As stated, in Epicurean philosophy, the goal of life is a kind of pleasure described as complete freedom from distress, or ataraxia (4.128.3–4). Pleasure can be experienced positively, i.e., through the enjoyment of some activity, or simply as the absence of distress. The Epicurean notion of maximum pleasure, in fact, revolves not around the accumulation of pleasure for its own sake, but rather around the minimization of distress and the pleasure derived from this state. In other words, life is less about the accumulation of pleasure than it is about the contentment that comes from the absence of distress. To Epicurus, this means that the knowledge of death is actually a cause of this contentment rather than of distress. This hinges on a correct understanding of death as being nothing to us, which contributes to contentment by eliminating the desire for immortality (4.124.8–10). In other words, once one realizes that death is nothing to them and that life is finite, they will no longer be perpetually distressed by a desire to prolong life and stave off death. If life has been pleasurable, they will greet death contentedly; if it has been miserable, they will do the same since further life offers little chance of improvement. In this way, knowledge of impending death should contribute to less distress in one’s life.
With respect to the objection concerning those affected by a person’s death, Epicurus would also disagree with its assumptions about pleasure and distress. First, the objection assumes that the poverty of one’s loved ones would be a cause of distress, principally for those loved ones and therefore also for the person who loves them. Epicurus would argue that poverty is not inherently bad and thus does not automatically cause distress. To the Epicureans, one useful strategy for minimizing distress is to limit the scope of one’s desires, thereby allowing oneself to live contentedly without very many things. In this way, a person can make do with little and still enjoy whatever pleasures they come by without worrying (4.130.6–8). This forms the basis of Epicurus’ view that whatever is good is easy to obtain. Though this might seem harsh, Epicurus actually argues persuasively that poverty is only a cause of distress if a person is not reasoning properly. The likelihood that one’s family will face poverty if one dies should therefore cause distress in neither that family nor the person who will die, since poverty is not necessarily bad. Any misery felt by the family at the death of their loved would be, according to Epicurus, somewhat nonsensical. Though this too might seem harsh, Epicureans believe that because the dead person no longer exists and suffers nothing, there is no reason to cry for that person; people are supposed to be content with mortality as a fact of life.
Another objection could be raised against premise three in light of these previous explanations. We have seen in the replies to the above objections that death can be viewed both as the absence of distress and as a force that reduces distress, namely through the knowledge it provides about life’s finiteness. The question then arises, since death contributes to the absence or lessening of distress, is not death a kind of pleasure on the Epicurean view? For instance, in the example cited above wherein a person greets death with content after a bad or unfortunate life, it would seem that they do so with a kind of relief akin to pleasure. Though somewhat more clever, this objection also fails under Epicurean examination. First, as Epicurus writes in an earlier passage, the source of all pleasure and distress is by axiom sensory experience. Because we do not exist after dying, death represents the privation, or complete less, of sense experience (4.124.6–8). Therefore, death can provide no pleasure to the dead, since they do not exist and cannot have any sort of sensory experience. In this sense, it is also wrong to look forward to death as a relief from past hardship; death is merely a void in which no pleasure or distress can be felt. Epicurus directly addresses this and implies that it is foolish when “the many” attach some value to death, whether by fleeing it to pursue more pleasure in life or by seeking it as a supposed relief from the bad things in life (4.125.9–11). The response to this objection in fact strengthens Epicurus’ conclusion that death is nothing to us, since it extends the logic used to argue that death poses no distress to show that it also offers no pleasure. This is true whether death is present or absent.
It thus seems to me that both premises two and three are true and that Epicurus’ second argument for the conclusion that death is nothing to us remains sound. Those who attempt to object to premise two, which holds that the anticipation of death creates distress in the present, inevitably fail to understand the meanings of pleasure and distress as held by the Epicureans. First, they might believe that the purpose of life is to maximize the accumulation of pleasure and that immortality would further this aim, when in reality, the goal is contentment with what pleasure one finds and the desire for immortality only serves to distress. Alternatively, objectors might mistakenly consider poverty or misery at the death of a loved one to be causes of distress, which they are not automatically; the Epicureans advise people both to limit their desires so as to be content with little and to remember that the dead are not suffering. Finally, Epicurus argues persuasively that death is neither a cause of distress nor of pleasure, hence it really is nothing to us. Those who object by arguing that death can reduce distress by relieving bad things in life forget that there is no corresponding response of pleasure as there would be in life. Whereas in life, the absence of distress corresponds to pleasure, death is simply the privation of all sense experience. Even when one escapes the troubles of life by dying, one cannot properly say that pleasure or relief awaits them in death, where they no longer exist. Epicurus’ second argument — in my view the stronger of the two offered — for the conclusion that death is nothing to us thus withstands its objections, and the conclusion appears to be true.
In this paper, I have attempted to argue that Epicurus’ argument for the conclusion that death is nothing to us is sound. First, I provide background on the source here analyzed, namely Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus. Then, I offer a summary and explanation of the argument before formally reconstructing it in valid, premise-conclusion form. Next, I evaluate the argument and find it to be sound before proposing and testing several strong objections to several of its premises. After responding to these objections as I believe Epicurus would have done, I offer a concluding analysis of his original argument, having withstood the challenges to it. I finish by asserting that Epicurus’ conclusion that death is nothing to us is true.
Bibliography
Inwood, Brad and L.P. Gerson. The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1994.
